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Abstract The rapid and increasing outsourcing of security services by states to
Private Security Companies (PSCs) in recent years and associated human rights
violations have served as one of the catalysts for long overdue regulation of the
global PSC industry. As part of an ‘empirical stocktaking’, this article focuses on
current multistakeholder self-regulatory developments in relation to PSCs, in
particular the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers and the
PSC1 certification standard, and considers their likely impact on the responsibility
of states in this area. What is clear is that the traditional conception of interna-
tional responsibility is ineffectual when applied to PSCs because of its focus on the
ex post facto responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. Furthermore,
the fact that PSCs operate in high risk and complex environments and the fact that
their clients are often non-state actors, means that an alternative prophylactic
approach to responsibility for human rights violations by PSCs seems to be nec-
essary. As it stands, however, the ‘self-regulation-plus’ approach adopted is not the
definitive solution. While endeavouring to ensure that PSCs respect human rights,
this approach may allow states to evade their own obligations to protect human
rights.
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1 Introduction
The unlawful activities of certain Private Security Companies (PSCs) have been the
focus of international scrutiny since the 1990s.1 More recently, however, the
international interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular, have highlighted
the increasing reliance of many states on such companies to provide security and
other logistical services to support their military forces, and the corresponding
accusations of human rights violations by PSCs. This article examines and assesses
the novel international multistakeholder self-regulatory mechanisms that have
emerged in response to the harmful human rights outcomes resulting from the
conduct of some PSCs and considers their likely impact on the responsibility of
states in this area.2 It departs substantially in its understanding of shared
responsibility as outlined in the conceptual framework of the SHARES project.3
While the SHARES project conceives of shared responsibility as the responsibility
for internationally wrongful acts that is shared by multiple actors, in this instance
PSCs and a state, this article highlights that developments in this area have taken a
different approach. PSCs operate in a complex and multilayered commercial
environment and, as will be seen, their activities often involve no direct interactions
with states. The emerging regulatory framework seeks to delineate clearly the extent
of PSC obligations in relation to human rights and their ultimate responsibility,
rather than mere accountability, for breaches of human rights. The Introduction to
this symposium recognises that the traditional rules on state responsibility probably
cannot be applied to PSCs and acknowledges that ‘strengthening standards and
commitments by both non-state actors and states, coupled with supervisory
mechanisms’4 is a promising alternative.
1 See e.g. ‘Sandline’ which was the subject of UN Doc. S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997) on the illegal
export of arms to Sierra Leone. For background on the Sandline affair see UK Select Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Second Report, Sierra Leone, 9 February 1999, HC 116-I, session 1998–1999. See also
the offensive operations carried out by Sandline International in Sierra Leone and Papau New Guinea in
e.g. Vierucci (2011), p. 235 and p. 237; and Wulf (2005), pp. 51–53. See also the mercenary activities of
‘Executive Outcomes’, another company with UK links, which was active in Angola and Sierra Leone in
the late 1990s, e.g. Ballesteros EB, ‘Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/24 (20 February 1997), in particular para. 15. For the mercenary activities of Executive
Outcomes’ personnel in various African states, see e.g. Wulf (2005), p. 39, p. 43 and p. 51; and Singer
(2011), pp. 101–118.
2 Different acronyms are used in the various international standards to refer to the companies discussed in
this article e.g. Private Security Companies (PSCs), Private Military Companies (PMCs), Private Security
Providers (PSPs) and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). The international standards
referred to throughout include companies within their scope on the basis of the service they provide or
function they perform. In the absence of an agreed definition, this article utilises the acronym appropriate
to the relevant standard and PSC in all other cases.
3 Nollkaemper and Jacobs (2013).
4 D’Aspremont et al. (2015), Section 5.3.
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In the aftermath of the United States (US)-led coalition interventions in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, hundreds of new PSCs were set up or their existing activities
expanded to take advantage of the emerging and extremely lucrative commercial
opportunities in security and reconstruction activities for donor governments.5 The
mounting reliance on PSCs by states is a direct result of donor state reductions in
‘the size of their armed forces’ to focus on ‘the ‘‘core’’ task of combat fighting’.6 In
privatising these activities and delegating functions to PSCs, states have ‘deliber-
ately created … an anarchy’, that is, a ‘social arrangement which is not centrally
controlled by a government’.7 In the current absence of international legal
regulation of PSCs there has been a clear move towards using what the United
Kingdom (UK) government has termed ‘robust regulation and monitoring’. The so-
called ‘Swiss Initiative’, formulated by the Swiss Government and the International
Committee of the Red Cross, has offered a starting point for serious international
multistakeholder discussions around the role of Private Military and Security
Contractors (PMSCs) in armed conflicts and has culminated in the publication of the
Montreux Document in 2008.8 Stakeholders involved in the drafting of the
Montreux Document have continued to meet with the goal of clarifying the
obligations and responsibilities of the security companies themselves. This has led
to the drafting of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers
(ICoC) and the establishment of a multistakeholder oversight body, namely, the
International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA).9 While the Montreux
Document represents the first intergovernmental statement of existing state legal
obligations in relation to PMSCs, the ICoC and ICoCA seek to ensure blanket
improvement of PSC industry standards, including respect for and compliance with
human rights standards, through the use of a certification or audit process
accompanied by institutional oversight and compliance measures.10
This article has two goals. Firstly, it examines the extent to which these new self-
regulatory approaches set out PSC human rights obligations and the ways in which
PSCs can be held responsible, if at all, for human rights violations. By focusing on the
5 See Krahmann (2007). On the history of increasing privatisation of the security sector in general see
e.g. Likosky (2009).
6 Krahmann (2007), p. 112.
7 Frost (2008), p. 51.
8 Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, Montreux, 17
September 2008 (Swiss Initiative, in Cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, on
Private Military and Security Companies) (Montreux Document).
9 Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament, ‘Private Military and Security Company Industry’, 10
March 2011, c 78WS, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/
cm110310/wmstext/110310m0001.htm. While there is no international legal regulation of PSCs at pre-
sent, the Human Rights Council in Res. 15/26 (7 October 2010), mandated an ‘Open-ended intergov-
ernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework
on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies’.
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies (ICoC), 9 November 2010, available at
http://www.icoc-psp.org. International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA), Articles of Association
(2013), available at http://www.icoca.ch/en/articles_of_association.
10 See generally the ICoC; the ICoCA Articles of Association, Arts. 2, 11 and 12.
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responsibility of the PSCs themselves, it can be argued that industry self-regulation may
allow states potentially to circumvent their responsibility to protect human rights under
international law in a very practical way, by shifting responsibility for human rights
violations to contractors. Some states, such as the US11 and UK however,12 take the
view that their participation and membership of the ICoC and ICoCA meet their general
due diligence obligations under international law to protect human rights, and their
particular commitments under the Montreux Document and the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles),13 to ensure that PSCs respect human
rights. Given that the scope and extent of state oversight of the ICoC and ICoCA is still
unclear and the grievance mechanism is not yet in place, it cannot be determined at
present whether participating states are meeting their international obligations. Indeed,
it can be argued rather that states are potentially distancing themselves from sharing
responsibility with PSCs and may in fact be imposing a higher share of responsibility
directly on companies for human rights violations than international law permits. The
‘Protect Respect Remedy’ framework of the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights reiterates that the primary obligation to protect human rights rests with
states and that business actors have a (non legally binding) obligation to respect human
rights, but the way in which the PSC regulatory framework has developed suggests that
states are interpreting their responsibility restrictively.14
Secondly, as part of an empirical stocktaking of developments in this area, this
article considers whether ‘self-regulation-plus’, of the type envisaged in the ICoC
and the ICoCA, and operationalised in the risk-based approach of industry
certification standards such as the PSC1 Management System for Quality of Private
Security Company Operations, is likely to be an effective tool for ensuring PSC
adherence to international human rights standards and the avoidance of adverse
human rights impacts.15 What is being witnessed in this recent PSC standard-setting
and the certification processes advocated by states and the PSC industry is a shift
towards norm-internalisation or socialisation of human rights as a means of
effecting behavioural change within these companies. Koh describes a culture of
11 ‘Section 833 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 required the Defense Department to
use business and operational standards in contracting and management of PSCs, with the intent of raising
the overall standard of performance of these companies. Pursuant to this requirement, the Department of
Defense facilitated the development of consensus based quality management standards. These standards
were recognised by the American National Standards Institute in March 2012. Since May, 2012, all
Defense Department contracts for private security functions performed overseas require conformance
with this standard’. US Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ‘Private Security Companies
(PSCs)’, 21 February 2014, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/psc.html.
12 On the UK’s position see ‘Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights’, ref: CM 8695, 4 September 2013, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/bhr-action-plan (UK National Action Plan), Section 2 (iv).
13 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and Commentary, Implementing the United
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04 (United Nations, 2011) (Guiding
Principles).
14 Guiding Principles.
15 US Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations—Requirements with
Guidance ANSI/ASIS PSC.1—2012 (PSC1). A management system in this context is a mechanism by
which the PSCs organisational structures, policies, procedures and processes are measured to determine
whether they meet certain standards, in particular human rights standards.
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human rights ‘norm-internalization’16 as a process of socialisation whereby one
moves from ‘grudgingly accepting a rule one time only to habitually obeying it’ as
‘the rule transforms from being some kind of external sanction to becoming an
internal imperative’.17 This requires what Murphy describes as a move towards
‘human rights preparedness’.18 She notes that
managing the risk of rights is part of managing risk, so there could be a way in
here for human rights. And because human rights reach beyond human rights
law, managing the risk of rights stretches beyond legal risk—beyond, that is,
claims and litigation concerning human rights violations. Rights as risk
encompasses, for instance, the potential for human rights activism to disrupt
the interests and overall standing of a government or organisation—a potential
that may be entirely detached from legal liability.19
Thus further questions arise as to whether the risk-based certification model affects the
responsibility of states. Is this approach shifting responsibility for human rights violations
onto PSCs or is governmental involvement in, and supposed oversight of, this new
regulatory regime a sufficient means for states to meet their obligations under international
law to protect human rights? What is clear is that there are several weaknesses in the self-
regulation-plus approach which must be addressed in order to increase the likelihood of
effective and credible regulation of PSC human rights compliance.
In light of their proposed governmental and civil society oversight and monitoring
elements, these new PSC regulatory mechanisms are labelled here ‘self-regulation-plus’
to differentiate them from more conventional forms of self-regulation. What has been
created through the ICoC is novel in some respects and deserves individual
consideration, because rather than neatly falling into one acknowledged category of
private ordering, the self-regulation-plus approach cuts across the self-regulation
‘spectrum’.20 It has long been recognised that there are different types of private
ordering: two decades ago Ogus talked of a ‘multitude of institutional arrangements’,
and noted that they are not all the same in terms of nature, structure and efficacy.21
Indeed, they may demonstrate ‘different degrees of legislative constraints, outsider
participation in relation to rule formulation or enforcement (or both), and external
control and accountability’.22 So while the adherence to the ICoC and membership of the
ICoCA are on the face of it voluntary in nature and to that extent are similar to other
existing self-regulatory mechanisms, particularly among business and human rights
initiatives, their approach also resembles other forms of mixed regulation such as co-
regulation because states, civil society actors and private actors (in this case PSCs) are
regulating jointly and ‘twinning public and private powers’.23 This can be seen in the
16 Koh (1999), p. 1400. See also generally Koh (2005); Goodman and Jinks (2003).
17 Koh (1999), p. 1400. For a riposte to Koh’s theory of norm internalisation see e.g. Franck (1998–1999).
18 Murphy (2013), p. 72.
19 Murphy (2013), p. 72 (emphasis in original).
20 Ogus (1995), p. 100.
21 Ogus (1995), p. 99.
22 Ogus (1995), p. 100.
23 Rawlings (2010), p. 2.
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state adoption of the certification standards, highlighted previously, and which
challenges the notion that the system is entirely voluntary because PSCs may be
contractually bound to comply.24
For states embracing this approach, it could be argued that in doing so they are
meeting their due diligence obligations in relation to the activities of PSCs operating
extraterritorially. Elements of meta-regulation are also present, notably ‘official
validation’ of the system by individual governmental contractual arrangements or
approval, and via membership of the ICoCA.25 Thus it seems that the ICoC and
ICoCA’s self-regulation-plus has the potential to be a positive and sophisticated
example of a ‘hybridized system[s] of both market and social regulation’ which may
‘open up further vistas’26 of ‘collaborative governance’.27
2 Regulation of Private Security Companies
Notwithstanding the increasingly large numbers of active PSCs, the industry has
been subject to little significant national or international regulation beyond basic
company law requirements of home or host states.28 At the same time, it is evident
that PSC business models have become progressively more organised, professional
and corporate in nature and structure:
PSCs have grown to such a degree that today they are organized along corporate
lines (including boards of directors, share-holdings and corporate structures)
their work has a clear contractual aim and obligation to their clients.29
This corporatisation and professionalisation of PSCs can be traced to a desire on
the part of the PSC industry to distinguish and distance commercial security
activities and logistical support from the direct combat activities of mercenaries.30
The former head of the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries, Gomez del
24 See n. 11.
25 Rawlings (2010), p. 2; see also Parker (2007), chapter 7.
26 Rawlings (2010), p. 6.
27 Freeman (1997), p. 4.
28 Although see n. 9.
29 O’Brien (2007), p. 38.
30 O’Brien (2007), pp. 37–39; See International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (Additional Protocol I), Art. 47(2) which contains the
most widely recognised definition of ‘mercenary’ in the context of international armed conflicts. It
provides that a mercenary is an individual whose primary motivation for participating in the hostilities is
the ‘desire for private gain’. This definition has been criticised as ‘being crafted quite restrictively’
(Dinstein (2010), p. 57) and ‘unworkable’ (Hampson (1991), p. 30). Faiza Patel of the UN Working
Group on Mercenaries has stated that while there are ‘indications of strong disapproval of the
involvement of private actors in combat activities, there was no clear international prohibition’, Human
Rights Council, ‘Report of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of
elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the
activities of private military and security companies on its second session’, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/41 (24
December 2012), para. 16.
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Prado, points out, however, that the line between PSCs [or Private Military and
Security Companies (PMSCs)] and mercenaries is often blurred given that the
‘security industry of private companies moves large quantities of weapons and
military equipment’ and ‘[i]t provides services for military operations’, as well as
recruiting former military personnel ‘to carry out passive or defensive security’ in a
civilian capacity.31 Direct participants in hostilities or mercenaries are excluded
from the scope of this article, which focuses instead on the regulation of providers
of lawful commercial security services.
PSCs, like all other private business actors, fall outside of the reach of international
law and they are not bound by international human rights law in particular.32 So while
well-known allegations of human rights abuses by the employees of PSCs such as
‘Blackwater’, ‘Titan’ and others in relation to their activities in conflict, post-conflict
and fragile regions have proliferated throughout the past decade or so and have
attracted much international attention, these abuses have not resulted in legal
accountability or responsibility under international law.33 There are two key reasons
for this in international law, a third reason which relates to the nature of PSC clients,
and a fourth reason relating to the lack of national legislation.
Firstly, for the purposes of attribution of conduct under international law, PSCs
do not meet the strict criteria for attribution for they do not exercise governmental
authority, nor does the contractual relationship with governments sufficiently infer
that they are acting under the direction and control of a state.34 Secondly, PSCs do
not possess the requisite legal personality necessary for the application of
international legal responsibility. The prevailing paradigm within which interna-
tional law operates, has traditionally adhered to a subject-object dichotomy in
relation to international legal personality.35 Accordingly, this means that states are
subjects of international law because only they, on this analysis, exercise sovereign
power and business actors are merely objects of international law for the purposes of
applying and enforcing international human rights law.36 Higgins rightly describes
31 Gomez del Prado (2010).
32 See White and MacLeod (2008).
33 On the human rights allegations against PSCs, see MacLeod (2011). See also Gomez del Prado (2010).
For an outline of the Nisour Square incident see Chesterman and Fisher (2009), p. 222. The Blackwater
case in the US stalled, but new charges were successfully prosecuted against four Blackwater employees,
with one convicted of first-degree murder and three convicted of voluntary manslaughter, see US
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Press Release, ‘Four Former Blackwater Employees
Found Guilty of Charges in Fatal 2007 Shootings at Nisur Square in Iraq’, 22 October 2014.
34 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2)
(ARSIWA), Arts. 5–11; see White and MacLeod (2008).
35 There are examples of legal persons being admitted as subjects of international law, but they are
exceptional e.g. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16
November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3, Art. 137(1): ‘nor shall any State or natural or juridical person
appropriate’. See also Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 973
UNTS 3, as replaced by the 1992 Protocol, 27 November 1992, 1956 UNTS 255, as amended in 2000;
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, London/Moscow/Washington DC, 27 January 1967, in
force 10 October 1967, 610 UNTS 205; UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, New
York, 15 November 2000, in force 29 September 2003, 2225 UNTS 209.
36 See e.g. Vagts (1970); Zerk (2006), p. 104; Johns (1994).
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this situation as ‘an intellectual prison of our own choosing’ that is then ‘declared …
to be an unalterable constraint’, while Pellet criticises the ‘clearly ‘‘ideological’’
reasons’ which are operating to ‘avoid facing the consequences of questioning the
monopoly of States over international law’.37 Nonetheless, the effect of this position
is that PSCs may not be properly regarded as current subjects of international law
and, as such, are not bound by international human rights law.
It is this international legal lacuna that has led to the turn to standard-setting for
PSCs as one alternative to the application of state responsibility principles. To that
end, the international community is developing and adopting self-regulation-plus in
the form of multistakeholder soft law mechanisms which incorporate government,
civil society and industry oversight, as well as certification and monitoring
processes which are intended to address, among other things, the harmful human
rights outcomes of some PSC’s activities.
A third problem is that international human rights law was never intended to
apply horizontally. As Shelton remarks, human rights law was ‘designed to restrain
abuses by powerful States and State agents, not to regulate the conduct of non-State
actors’.38 Thus human rights apply vertically between individuals and states rather
than horizontally between affected individuals or groups and PSCs. When
considering the question of legal accountability and responsibility in relation to
PSCs, it is therefore crucial to note that such companies operate frequently outside
conflict zones, albeit in what are often referred to as complex, challenging or high-
risk environments, and that they are regularly contracted by non-state clients. So
when trying to apply traditional state-oriented principles of international legal
responsibility for wrongful acts, depending on the type of client, the rules of
attribution may be simply irrelevant if no state actors are involved. The question of
whether the home state of the PSC has performed adequate due diligence of course
remains, but as will be seen it is not yet clear whether the emerging PSC regulatory
regime satisfies its requirements. A significant proportion of PSC contracts relate to
the provision of security services for a variety of non-state actors including non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and other commercial entities.39 For example,
they may provide mobile security for humanitarian workers in natural disaster
zones, transportation for election monitors from intergovernmental organisations in
unstable regions, or static guarding of oil and gas facilities for natural resource
companies in high risk environments. Due to client sensitivities around this topic, of
both commercial and NGO clients, as well as commercial confidentiality issues, it is
difficult to ascertain the extent to which non-state actors utilise PSCs.40 Determining
the extent of their use by the NGO sector is particularly problematic (as for a variety
of reasons many NGOs oppose the use of PSCs)41 but in 2006, Singer noted that:
37 Higgins (1995), p. 49; Pellet (2008), p. 38, para. 8.
38 Shelton (2002), p. 279.
39 On the use of PSCs by NGOs generally see e.g. Singer (2006). See also, Spearin (2007).
40 Singer (2006), p. 70. On the use of PSCs by NGOs generally see Spearin (2007).
41 Singer (2006), p. 69.
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Industry representatives estimate that approximately 25 % of the ‘high-end’
firms that provide security services, and over 50 % of firms that provide
military support or logistics functions, such as military air transport, have
worked for humanitarian clients.42
PSC operations in these contexts have tended to attract less global attention than
those in places, particularly conflict zones, where states are the predominant, but not
the only, clients. More importantly, any human rights violations by PSCs contracted
to non-state clients are likely to operate in a legal vacuum unless it can be
established that a state has failed to meet the requirements of the general principle of
due diligence. So, for example, while the UK government has indicated that it will
‘urge’ non-state clients to ‘commit to contracting only with PSCs that are pursuing
certification against recognised standards by accredited certifying bodies’ this
undemanding approach may not satisfy the due diligence requirement.43
Fourthly, regulatory developments at the national level are very limited. A recent
sample study undertaken by the author makes clear that the majority of states do not
have specific regulatory mechanisms addressed to PSCs. Of 78 states examined in
the initial study, only a limited number have implemented or drafted legislation, or
introduced policy measures directed towards PSCs, and a meagre handful make
explicit reference to applicable human rights standards.44 A further problem is that
existing national regulatory mechanisms focus on state-clients. The French
delegation at the second session of the UN inter-governmental working group on
PMSCs observed that when enacting domestic legislation in this area it is
‘important’ to include other clients such as ‘international organizations and
companies’.45
Given the lack of, and limitations in, national and international regulation,
several factors have combined to further drive the shift towards norm-setting and
compliance initiatives. Recent allegations about the adverse human rights impacts
of certain PSC activities have resulted in increasing scrutiny of, for example, ‘G4S’
in South Africa, ‘G4S Australia’ at Manus Island Detention Centre in Papua New
Guinea, and ‘Saracen International’ in Somalia.46 In addition, the perceived failure
of industry-based self-regulatory codes of conduct, as well as national legal systems,
to hold PSCs to account for human rights violations, have also served to galvanise
the international community into action to address the absence of regulation,
42 Singer (2006), p. 70.
43 UK National Action Plan, ‘New Actions Planned’ (ii).
44 MacLeod S, ‘Consideration of the Human Rights Aspects: Review of All Measures including Existing
National Legislation for Registering, Licensing and Contracting PMSCs’, Invited Expert Intervention to
the Open-ended inter-governmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an
international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private
military and security companies, third session, 21–25 July 2014, Geneva, Palais des Nations.
45 Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/41 (24 December 2012), para. 72.
46 Cockayne (2012). On the allegations against G4S at Manus Island Detention Centre, Papua New
Guinea, see the submissions made to the Australian Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs References
Committee’s ‘Inquiry into the incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre during 16 February to
18 February 2014’, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/
Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Manus_Island/Submissions.
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responsibility and accountability.47 It was in particular the inability of one of the
PSC industry’s most prominent trade associations, the International Peace Operators
Association (IPOA) (now the International Stability Operations Association) to hold
the infamous ‘Blackwater USA’ to account for the massacre in Nisour Square in
Iraq, that highlighted the failings of solely industry-based self-regulation. Black-
water was a member of IPOA and voluntarily subject to that organisation’s internal
code of conduct. On being informed of an IPOA investigation into events at Nisour
Square, Blackwater left the organisation, changed its name to ‘Xe Services’ and
today continues to win US government contracts to operate in Iraq as ‘Academi’.48
Such deficiencies in voluntary self-regulation intensified pressure from civil society,
and in an increasingly competitive market place has led to many in the PSC industry
becoming increasingly sensitive to reputational damage, while states which are
home to significant numbers of PSCs (such as the UK and US) have realised that
regulatory inaction was no longer an option.
Consequently, two different but interlinked, multistakeholder projects emerged to
address the regulatory gaps and to create standards and implement monitoring and
compliance procedures for PSCs, namely the Montreux Document and the ICoC
together with the Articles of Association of the newly constituted ICoCA.49
3 Emerging Standards: The Montreux Document, ICoC and the PSC1
Quality Management Standard
While the Montreux Document itself does not fall within the category of self-
regulation-plus mechanisms, it is an important starting point for understanding the
development of both the ICoC and ICoCA. The Montreux Document is essentially a
non-binding restatement of the existing international legal obligations of states
which are home to, host to, or contract with PMSCs. It seeks to ‘promote
compliance’ with international humanitarian law and international human rights law
during armed conflict only.50 No new international obligations are created for
states.51 It also sets out ‘good practices’ which may be ‘instructive’ for PMSCs but
does not create legal obligations for them.52 In contrast, the ICoC is addressed
directly to PSCs, and signatory companies undertake to ‘commit to the responsible
provision of Security Services so as to support the rule of law, respect the human
rights of all persons, and protect the interests of their clients’.53
Proponents of these initiatives highlight their multistakeholder approach and
attempts to ensure oversight and monitoring and argue that this renders these initiatives a
47 See Cole (2007). On the failed criminal prosecutions in the US see e.g. Quirico (2011), pp. 423–424.
48 See Cole ‘Blackwater Quits Security Association’; Quirico (2011), pp. 423–424; Chesterman and
Fisher (2009), p. 222; Apuzzo (2014).
49 Montreux Document; ICoC; ICoCA. On the drafting of the Montreux Document see Cockayne (2008).
50 Montreux Document, Preface, paras. 1–3.
51 Montreux Document, Preface, para. 4.
52 Montreux Document, Preface, para. 5.
53 ICoC, Preamble, para. 3; White (2011).
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more ‘robust’ form of self-regulation, in other words an approach which attempts to be
more effective in ensuring accountability than traditional forms of self-regulation, i.e. it
is self-regulation-plus.54 Most notably this is to be achieved through the use of
certification procedures or auditing and this is examined in more detail below.
Both the Montreux Document and the ICoC are products of so-called multistakeholder
processes which involve the participation of states, the PSC industry, as well as civil
society actors, and which demonstrate an emerging shift from traditional forms of
international law-making towards something akin to ‘top-down-bottom-up’ regulation. So
rather than international law always being imposed on non-state actors by states from
above, top-down–bottom-up approaches are hybrid in nature and combine legislative ‘top-
down’ approaches with softer ‘bottom-up’ non-legislative mechanisms. Such an analysis
links clearly with Slaughter’s ‘liberal theory’ of international law, where she describes
these types of regulatory developments as ‘multiple bodies of rules, norms and processes
that contribute to international order’ which encompass everything from ‘voluntary codes
of conduct adopted by individual and corporate actors operating in transnational society’
to ‘transnational and transgovernmental law’ and ‘traditional public international law’.55
In the case of the ICoC and ICoCA the process involves different stakeholders, in this case
governments, civil society and industry, working together to create a mutually agreed
regulatory standard but without the legislative element. What remains unclear, however, is
the extent to which states are fulfilling their international human rights obligations by
choosing the softer option of self-regulation-plus and omitting legislative options.
Certainly the government and industry drafters of the ICoC want it to be regarded as
an example of best practice in the business and human rights sphere. This can only be
achieved if the weaknesses identified above and below can be addressed. Such soft law
approaches to the regulation of PSCs are not universally welcomed and it is worth
noting that two separate UN working groups, on mercenaries and PMSCs, have
explored or are exploring the possibilities for creating binding regulation for the
industry through international conventions.56 At the second session of the inter-
governmental working group on PMSCs in July 2014, some states and civil society
actors expressed concern about the limitations of an audit-based self-regulation
scheme, despite the element of oversight incorporated into the ICoCA in paragraph
12.1 of its Articles of Association.57 Furthermore, at the 2014 Human Rights Council,
54 See e.g. UK National Action Plan.
55 Slaughter (2000), p. 242; Slaughter (1995). See also International Council on Human Rights Policy
(2002), p. 160.
56 In its 2010 report, the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, proposed a draft
convention for the regulation of PMSCs, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (12 July 2010). Subsequently a new
working group has been tasked with considering the treaty option, see Human Rights Council, Res. 15/26
(7 October 2010).
57 Human Rights Council, Open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of
elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities
of private military and security companies, third session, Geneva, 21–15 July 2014, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG/10/
3/3 (2014) at paras. 18 and 22. ICoCA Articles of Association 2013, Art. 12.1: ‘The Association shall be
responsible for exercising oversight of Member companies’ performance under the Code, including through
external monitoring, reporting and a process to address alleged violations of the code’.
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states voted in favour of elaborating a multilateral convention to ensure direct legal
responsibility of all business actors for human rights abuses, not just the PSC sector.58
Nevertheless, in the context of PSC-specific regulatory approaches, the
relationship with international law and in particular the responsibility of the state
for extraterritorial activities of its corporate nationals remains explicitly traditional,
at least in terms of the principles articulated. As highlighted above, the Montreux
Document is declaratory in nature and aims to ‘recall certain existing international
legal obligations of States regarding private military and security contractors’.59 It
applies only to the activities of PMSCs in situations of armed conflict but it is
addressed specifically to states. Furthermore, it notes throughout that the existing
obligations of states under international law remain unaffected. Paragraph 1 of part
A of the Montreux Document is unequivocal and provides that: ‘Contracting States
retain their obligations under international law, even if they contract PMSCs to
perform certain activities’. A distinction is made between contracting states
(clients),60 territorial states (the place of the PSC operation or project)61 and home
states (the state of incorporation of the PSC).62 While it is unclear how the
responsibilities of these different states transect, nevertheless the Montreux
Document is focused on state responsibility rather than that of PSCs.
In contrast to the Montreux Document, the ICoC and ICoCA address PSCs
directly and attempt in general terms to set out the extent of their human rights
obligations. Notwithstanding this focus, paragraph 2 of the ICoC Preamble records
that ‘well-established rules of international law apply to States in their relationships
with private security providers’ which would include states retaining the respon-
sibility to protect human rights. The state’s international legal obligations do not
transfer to PSCs through the contractual relationship. Moreover, paragraph 14
provides that the ICoC does not limit or alter the applicable international law, nor
does it establish any legal obligations or liabilities for PSCs. Companies are,
however, required to affirm their responsibility to respect human rights and to
establish fair and accessible grievance procedures that offer effective remedies for
human rights violations. One of the key strengths of the ICoC is that by focusing on
the obligations of the PSCs as opposed to states, there is the potential for human
rights norm-internalisation, as will be demonstrated in the following section.
The ICoCA was launched in September 2013 and its key function is to set out the
basic requirements for certification of PSCs63 and to monitor and assess PSC
compliance with the ICoC.64 Traditionally, effective self-regulation depends upon
58 Human Rights Council, Res. 26/9 ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’, UN Doc. A/HRC/
26/L.22/Rev.1 (25 June 2014); Human Rights Council, Res. 26/22 ‘Human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises’, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1 (23 June 2014).
59 Montreux Document, Part One, Introduction.
60 Montreux Document, paras. 1–8.
61 Montreux Document, paras. 14–17.
62 Montreux Document, paras. 18–21.
63 ICoCA Articles of Association 2013, Art. 11.
64 ICoCA Articles of Association 2013, Art. 12.
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the degree of ‘external control and supervision’ exercised by government.65 Thus
the issue of governmental ‘oversight’ and its definition becomes of crucial
importance in this instance, as can be seen below.
As of August 2014, there are 708 signatory companies to the ICoC from 70
countries.66 Presently there are 135 PSC members of ICoCA, 13 civil society
organisations (CSOs) and 6 states.67 Each of these three ‘pillars’ is now represented
within the ICoCA, which is tasked with ensuring compliance with the ICoC.68
Article 11.1 of the ICoCA Articles of Association provides that:
The Association shall be responsible for certifying under the Code that a
company’s systems and policies meet the Code’s principles and the standards
derived from the Code and that a company is undergoing monitoring, auditing,
and verification, including in the field.69
No specific certification standard is specified in the Articles of Association and
the ICoCA ‘shall define the certification requirements’ on the basis of ‘national or
international standards and processes’ which comply with the International Code of
Conduct.70 Allied to company certification is internal and external oversight as well
as a mechanism for addressing Code violations:
The Association shall be responsible for exercising oversight of Member
companies’ performance under the Code, including through external monitor-
ing, reporting and a process to address alleged violations of the code.71
At present it is unclear what form the oversight, monitoring, reporting and
grievance arrangements will take, but the ICoCA Articles of Association make clear
that it is the organisation that will exercise oversight not the member states. This again
raises the question of whether states will be able to claim to be fully meeting their
international legal obligations through this mechanism. Their active and dynamic
participation will be essential, otherwise states will be vulnerable to claims that they
have failed to meet their obligations in relation to their responsibility to protect human
rights. Work is ongoing to determine the nature and substance of these processes, so it
is too soon to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of the ICoCA, but its
multistakeholder three-pillar approach has much to commend it. The credibility of the
ICoCA will depend greatly on the robustness of the Board of Directors. It will also
depend on the merits of the mechanism chosen to deal with alleged violations of the
ICoC and how the Board tackles individual cases. In particular, the Board is obliged to
ensure that ‘effective remedies’ are provided by certified PSCs, but how this is to be
65 Page (1986), p. 143.
66 For the list of signatories see http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_September_
2013_-_Composite_List_SHORT_VERSION-1.pdf. Signatory status closed on 14 August 2013.
67 Including Australia, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US; for ICoCA membership see
http://www.icoca.ch.
68 ICoCA Articles of Association 2013, Art. 3.1.
69 ICoCA Articles of Association 2013, Art. 11.1.
70 ICoCA Articles of Association 2013, Art. 11.2.1.
71 ICoCA Articles of Association 2013, Art. 12.1.
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achieved remains to be seen. At the July 2014 meeting of the UN inter-governmental
working group on PMSCs many states voiced concern about the effectiveness of the
ICoC approach and ICoCA oversight, but it is simply too early to draw conclusions
about their efficacy at this stage.
4 Towards Norm Internalisation?
So what do these developments mean for state responsibility for human rights
violations in the PSC context? Steven Ratner argued in 2001 that there has been an
‘erosion of the domain reservé’ which presents ‘a challenge to the traditional
prerogative of States to regulate companies within their jurisdiction’.72 Ratner claimed
that ‘[t]he question is not whether non-State actors have rights and duties but what
those rights and duties are’.73 At that time he concluded that states remained
ambivalent about ‘accepting corporate duties’ especially in relation to human rights
duties.74 Nevertheless, he took the view that such ‘duties of a company’ were ‘a direct
function of its capacity to harm human dignity’.75 He noted that
Proposing international norms of corporate responsibility for violations of
human dignity continues the trajectory that the law has taken, but it also
represents new challenges for the enterprise. It challenges the state’s exclusive
prerogative (what some might call sovereignty) to regulate business
enterprises by making them a subject of international scrutiny; it makes them
entities that have their own duties to respect human rights.76
Given the way in which the self-regulation-plus regime has developed in relation
to PSCs, it is difficult to see how the state’s prerogative to regulate business actors is
being challenged. Furthermore, the regulatory mechanisms are clear that state
obligations and responsibility remain unaffected. It is possible, however, that the
way in which the third party audit and certification process operates could, through
the push towards internalisation of human rights norms in particular, result in a
situation where more responsibility is being placed on PSCs for human rights
violations and states are, if not quite shedding elements of responsibility, at least
distancing themselves from sharing responsibility. This is related directly to the
construction of the regulatory arrangements.
The PSC regulatory regime developed is complex and involves many different
layers of actors beyond states, civil society and industry. PSCs will be required to
demonstrate to auditors that they are complying with the human rights set out in
the ICoC, that they are conducting Human Rights Risk Assessments and Analysis,
and that they have instituted third party grievance mechanisms. States are
removed from the various processes. As highlighted above, the ICoCA retains
72 Ratner (2001), p. 524.
73 Ratner (2001), p. 476.
74 Ratner (2001), p. 487.
75 Ratner (2001), p. 524.
76 Ratner (2001), p. 540.
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responsibility for oversight, monitoring and remedies, but at the level below,
national accreditation bodies are required to certify certification bodies which in
turn carry out the audits of PSCs. It is this complexity which could lead to states
not meeting their international legal responsibilities. In this system, participant
states must provide effective oversight of the ICoC itself, as well as their own
national accreditation and certification bodies, because a failure to do so will
result in this fragile regulatory house of cards falling apart. It is not enough that
states become members of the ICoCA, as the success and credibility of the
regulatory regime is dependent upon states upholding consistently the effective-
ness of the international and national elements of the certification process. It is
only by doing this that states can truly claim to be meeting their international
human rights obligations. To acquire an understanding of the extent to which
states may be distancing themselves from their responsibility to protect human
rights, it is necessary to examine the mechanisms established. So what does the
certification process look like and how should it work?
4.1 PSC1 and the Shift towards Norm Internalisation
As outlined previously, the ICoC sets out a requirement for signatory companies to
undertake certification or an audit to measure the extent of its compliance with the
Code.77 To that end, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and ASIS
International developed a quality management system standard that includes
specific requirements for audited PSCs to demonstrate that they have considered
human rights risks and adverse human rights impacts as part of their management
system, as well as providing remedy mechanisms for third parties affected by
harmful outcomes of PSC activities.78 PSC1, as it is known, has been endorsed and
adopted by the UK government as the ‘applicable standard for UK-based PSCs
working in complex environments on land overseas’, and since May 2012 all
contracts undertaken by the US Department of Defence require conformity to the
standard.79 The PSC1 standard has been piloted in the UK.80 It also forms the basis
77 ICoC 2010, para. 8; see also the ICoC Association Articles of Association 2013.
78 US Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations—Requirements with
Guidance (PSC1).
79 Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament, ‘Private Security Companies’, HC Deb 17 December
2012, c 72WS, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121217/
wmstext/121217m0001.htm. While it was stated that the government would issue a ‘publication
specifying that ASIS PSC 1-2012 is the applicable standard for UK-based PSCs working in complex
environments on land overseas’ no such document has been issued. UK National Action Plan, under ‘New
Actions Planned’, the UK will (ii) ‘[b]egin certifying Private Security Companies in the UK based on the
agreed UK standard for land-based companies, by working with the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) to
take forward the certification process, ensuring this includes expert human rights advice’. US Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ‘Private Security Companies (PSCs)’.
80 The author acted as a Human Rights Subject-Matter Expert for an independent Certification Bodies
which participated in the PSC1 pilot scheme and which was supported by the UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS).
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of a proposed international standard at the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO).81
PSC1 is a Quality Management System (QMS) developed with the aim of
improving standards across the PSC industry and human rights standards in
particular.82 Emphasis is therefore placed on ensuring high standards of manage-
ment throughout the organisation of the company. A company’s conformance with
the PSC1 standard will generally be measured, but not always, by independent third
party Certification Bodies or auditors during a two-stage audit which takes place at
both the PSC’s headquarters (stage 1) and on-site (stage 2). The company pays for
the audit. A PSC1 audit is not specifically focused on human rights, its remit is
much broader, but human rights language runs throughout the entire standard and
the improved protection of human rights was very much a driving force behind the
creation of the standard. In addition to the ICoC, it is clear that PSC1 draws heavily
upon the Protect, Respect, Remedy approach of the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, especially in relation to its due diligence and grievance
procedure requirements.83
In particular, PSCs are required to demonstrate that they have taken into account
any potential adverse human rights impacts on external stakeholders. It is therefore
necessary for a PSC to identify any external stakeholders likely to be affected by its
activities, e.g. local communities. Moreover, while PSC1 does not specifically
require that PSCs undertake a Human Rights Risk and Impact Analysis (HRRIA), it
is clear that some form of human rights risk assessment is expected. The informative
Commentary annexed to PSC1 does make a specific reference to HRRIAs but the
standard itself does not use that language. This is something which companies have
identified as confusing, and consequently they are unclear about their specific
obligations in regard to HRRIAs.
PSC1 also includes an upstream and downstream due diligence requirement so
that companies must carry out due diligence in relation to both their clients and their
contractors and supply chains. This approach is in line with the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights. It seems likely that due diligence in
relation to contractors and the supply chain will be easier to undertake than in
relation to clients. There appears to be some reluctance on the part of PSCs to
demand human rights due diligence of their clients, probably as a result of a highly
competitive market. It is perceived by some PSCs that this could exclude them from
certain contracts, but of course if the clients are educated and aware of their
‘baseline’ responsibility to respect human rights, then in theory this should become
less problematic particularly as the Guiding Principles undergo wider dissemination
and implementation.
81 ISO PC/284 Management system for private security operations—requirements with guidance,
available at http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=4857900. The author is a member
of British Standards Institute Mirror Committee to ISO PC/284 and a member of the UK delegation to the
ISO committee. As of August 2014, the standard is at the third draft stage and it is anticipated that it will
become a full ISO standard in 2015.





PSC1 also requires conforming companies to have in place incident monitoring
and reporting mechanisms. In addition, there must be accessible grievance and
whistle-blower policies, and procedures which must be communicated to both
internal and external stakeholders. Where a complaint is made, the PSC must
document the corrective actions taken and any ‘compensation and redress given to
the affected parties’.84 Ongoing monitoring and continual improvement of the
company’s procedures and processes is a crucial aspect of the PSC1 standard.
4.2 UK PSC1 Pilot Scheme
A pilot scheme commenced in August 2013 in the UK to ‘road-test’ PSC1 as part of the
UK government’s self-described commitment to industry self-regulation. The UK has
been actively involved in the drafting of the ICoC and development of the ICoCA and
its participation follows many years of regulatory inaction in this area.85 In doing so,
the UK government considers itself to be meeting its obligations to ensure human
rights protection through its support for ‘robust regulation’.86 Specifically, it regards
its adoption of the PSC1 certification standard87 with eventual ICoCA oversight as
helping the UK to fulfil its ‘commitments’ under the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights as set out in the UK National Action Plan.88 The pilot
scheme was supported and closely followed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office. In addition, the UK Accreditation Service, which was to certify approved
Certification Bodies to carry out PSC1 audits, was actively involved in monitoring the
auditing process both in the UK and at audited project sites.
The scope of PSC1 is broad and applies to PSCs offering services and operating in
complex environments. It therefore extends beyond conflict zones. As mentioned
previously, there is no specific guidance on how a PSC should consider and address
‘adverse human rights impacts’ within its operations, e.g. through the use of HRRIAs.
Nevertheless, there appears to be no hierarchy of risks and it seems to be the case that
human rights risks are to be regarded as a risk in the same way as health and safety or
environmental risks. The question is, to what extent will defining human rights as a risk
and assessing potential adverse human rights impacts be an effective way to ensure
compliance with human rights standards, and ultimately prevent the occurrence of
human rights violations? Murphy notes that the move towards a risk-based approach is
becoming increasingly common in a variety of spheres:
Rights as risk—emphasises a now dominant feature of governance: namely,
the assessment and management of risk. Today, governments and
84 US Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations—Requirements with
Guidance (PSC1), para. 9.5.6.
85 ICoC 2010. For the history of PSC regulation in the UK see Alexander and White (2009).
86 Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament, ‘Private Military and Security Company Industry’, supra
n. 9.
87 Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament, ‘Private Security Companies’, supra n. 79.
88 Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament, ‘Private Security Providers Association Launch’, HC Deb
15 October 2013, c 51WS, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/
cm131015/wmstext/131015m0001.htm; UK National Action Plan; Guiding Principles.
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organisations alike are expected to identify and handle the risks (financial,
legal, political, reputational and so on) to which they are exposed.89
By requiring PSCs seeking certification to assess human rights as a potential risk
and to implement an HRIA, PSC1 has the capacity to help ‘internalise’ human rights
norms within a company’s culture and to raise awareness of human rights impacts.
Reputational damage is of particular concern to those in the PSC sector. They
have become susceptible to ‘brand tarnishing’ and ‘reputational disaster’ in the
same way that the natural resource sector did in the 1990s.90 The market for security
services is extremely competitive and the highly publicised actions of a few
companies in recent years have rendered the industry very sensitive to reputational
risk and the potential impact that allegations of human rights abuses might have on
their ability to win future contracts. This of course does not apply to rogue PSCs
which choose to remain outside regulatory frameworks and which will continue to
violate international human rights standards regardless.
5 Conclusion
It is clear that the traditional conception of international responsibility is ineffectual
when applied to PSCs because of its focus on the ex post facto responsibility of
states for internationally wrongful acts. No state has been found responsible in
international law for the unlawful activities of its PSC contractors. In light of this,
and the fact that PSCs operate in high risk and complex environments and that their
clients are often non-state actors, an alternative prophylactic approach to
responsibility for human rights violations seems to be necessary. The emerging
multilayered regulatory framework in the form of the Montreux Document, the
ICoC, the ICoCA, PSC1 and the draft ISO standard represents current progress. As
it stands, however, this self-regulation-plus approach is not the definitive solution. It
lets states off the hook in terms of ensuring that PSCs abide by their obligations, but
in doing so this allows states to evade their own obligations to protect human rights.
What is clear is that the extent to which self-regulation-plus reflects any shared
responsibility between states and PSCs, and the likely effectiveness of the ICoC and
ICoCA human rights risk model as applied though a standard such as PSC1, depend
on a variety of factors:
1. State involvement and support.
2. Ability to deal with non-certified and rogue PSCs.
3. Scope of the certification.
4. Auditor competence.
5. Human Rights Impact Assessments.
6. Client awareness, education and training.
89 Murphy (2013), p. 72. See also Whitty (2011), on ‘legal risk’ and ‘legal risk?’.
90 Chandler G, Keynote Speech, JUSTICE/Sweet and Maxwell conference, ‘Corporate Liability Human
Rights and the Modern Business’, 12 June 2006 (on file with author).
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First, in terms of state responsibility, civil society organisations and some states
continue to express some general concerns that the adoption of any human rights
risk certification scheme will result in states not complying with their international
obligations.91 Despite the fact that the Montreux Document and the ICoC make
clear that states cannot transfer their international legal obligations to PSCs through
the contractual relationship, nevertheless, the distance created by the very nature of
the QMS process (state—accreditation body—certification body—PSC) lends
credence to the concern. The PSC could be kept very much at arm’s length from
state oversight both at the international and national level. What is clear is that if the
ICoCA oversight mechanism and other elements are perceived as weak and lacking
in credibility, states will be unable to rely on these mechanisms as evidence that
international human rights obligations are being met. Therefore, in addition to
general oversight of the operation of the ICoCA, development of a consistent and
robust oversight culture by the participant states of their accreditation bodies and
certification bodies, as well as the PSCs themselves, is crucial to the credibility and
effectiveness of the certification scheme, and of course to ensure that states meet
their own international obligations. Active state involvement and support for the
ICoC and any certification process undertaken by PSCs is crucial. For example,
there are reports of certain non-ICoCA host state authorities refusing auditors on-
site access to monitor PSC conformance with PSC1.92 The reasons for such refusals
are unclear but it may be for security reasons, or more likely it may be due to a
simple lack of knowledge on the part of the host state about the, as yet, immature
PSC1 process. Such behaviour undermines the whole process so it is essential that
ICoCA member-states in particular disseminate information, both at home and in
host states, throughout government agencies about the certification process,
especially to those likely to encounter auditors in order to encourage support for,
and the embedding of, the new standards. By ensuring robust oversight at all stages
ICoCA member states will help to reinforce the credibility of the system and
perhaps reassure some of the more skeptical states and members of civil society
about its effectiveness.
Second, are the ICoC mechanisms capable of dealing with rogue PSCs, which
after all are the reason for the implementation of the standards in the first place?
What about non-certified companies? What happens if there is non-conformance
with the certified standard? The emphasis of this emerging regulatory regime is
clearly focused on the responsibility of PSCs themselves as opposed to state clients.
It seems that states are determined to keep their responsibility at arm’s length which
may well be a function of the different clients that contract with PSCs. The
continued existence of non-certified rogue PSCs which do not engage with the
ICoCA processes present perhaps the greatest challenge for states and for state
responsibility. It is, therefore, in the interest of home states to ensure that all PSCs
engage with the ICoCA. The US and the UK have gone some way to encouraging
this by adopting the PSC1 standard but other states are waiting for the ISO standard
to be finalised. States should also be encouraging, if not requiring outright, other
91 Human Rights Council, third session draft report, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG/10/3/3 (2014).
92 Confidential interview with PSC1 accredited auditor, 2 June 2014 (on file with author).
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PSC clients in the commercial and NGO sectors to contract only with ICoC
compliant PSCs.
Third, there are some concerns about the potentially limited scope of the PSC1
standard. It should be noted that the decision to apply for PSC1 certification is
voluntary, as is adherence to the ICoC Code of Conduct. Indeed a PSC may self-
certify that its operations are in conformance with PSC1. Furthermore, the PSC itself
chooses the geographical scope of the certification. Thus a PSC may have
operations in several different countries, but the certification might only apply to
one project in one country. So, for example, a PSC may be contracted to operate in a
conflict zone such as Afghanistan or Iraq, but it chooses to apply for PSC1
certification for a security operation in a non-conflict (but potentially high risk)
country. It is therefore extremely important that the clients of PSCs (states, other
companies and NGOs) are made aware of the possible limitations of the certification
and are educated on how to determine the extent of the advertised PSC1
certification.
Fourth, it is essential that the third party auditors used to certify PSCs are
competent in human rights. In the UK Pilot Scheme, the certification bodies adopted
different approaches. It was envisaged by some that the ‘[c]ertification teams will
include significant human rights expertise—though paid for by the PMSC being
certified’, but this was certainly not the case for all of the pilot certifications
undertaken.93 Some certification bodies have adopted this approach and have
appointed Human Rights Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assess the human rights
elements of the PSC1 standard. Others have bought in training for their auditors.
There must be discussion about the merits of the different approaches as there is
some concern that the certification bodies utilising SMEs are holding PSCs to a
higher human rights standards than others. It is anticipated that the UK
Accreditation Service will be issuing draft guidance on the matter for consultation
but there must be a wider debate on this issue. Failing that, the lack of consistency
will potentially impact on the credibility of the PSC1 certification process.
Fifth, credible strategic and operational HRRIAs must be defined in the standards
and undertaken by PSCs. At present it is unclear how a PSC should assess human
rights risk and impacts and which tools it should use. The extent to which there is
engagement with human rights expertise by the industry is also unclear. It is
important that human rights risks and adverse impacts are being identified and
assessed at both the management and operational levels and that companies are not
engaging in a mere tick-box exercise.
Finally, the effectiveness of the PSC1 certification standard will be dependent
upon the extent to which all clients, governmental, commercial and civil society,
understand the certification process. In particular, it is important that they
understand the potentially limited scope of certification and the importance of
auditor human rights competence.
Given these significant concerns it is crucial that states actively support the
development of the emerging certification process to ensure that the system matures




interest of states to do so if they expect the international community to accept that
their due diligence obligations under international law to protect human rights are
being met. Anything else will be perceived as unsatisfactorily shifting all
responsibility for human rights violations onto PSCs.
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